**DISCLAIMER**

This report is written by country analysts from Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. It covers topics that are relevant for status determination of Libyan and non-Libyan citizens whose asylum claims are based on the situation in Libya. The target audience is case workers/officers within the decision-making authorities handling asylum claims as well as policy makers in the four countries.

The report is based on carefully selected and referenced sources of information. To the extent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked.

While the information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care, this document does not claim to be exhaustive, neither is it conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

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The research for this report was finalised in November 2014 and any event or development that has taken place after this date is not included in the report.
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1. INTRODUCTION

This report is a result of a cooperation project between the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) in Belgium, the Country of Origin Information Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, the Office for Country Information and Language Analysis (OCILA) of the Ministry of Security and Justice in the Netherlands, Landinfo in Norway and Lifos in Sweden.

The purpose of the project is to present information on the current situation in Libya on selected topics, and is intended to serve the information needs for the assessment of asylum and immigration cases, as well as issues concerning the return of rejected applicants to Libya.

The topics in focus are described in six different reports:

- Security Situation
- Vulnerable Groups
- Militias, Tribes and Islamists
- Judiciary and Security Sector
- Nationality, Registration and Documents

Some issues will be covered in more than one report, as they are interrelated and necessary for the context.\(^1\) In the reports we make use of a transcription scheme for words and names from Arabic to English.\(^2\)

Since the end of the former regime, there has been much focus on the political development and the security situation in the country, reflected both in media coverage and reports and commentaries published by think tanks, NGO's, aid agencies and other actors. However, despite a large flow of information coming out of Libya, there is a substantial lack of systematic reporting on most issues. When writing reports on the situation in Libya, the main challenge is to identify patterns in the plethora of anecdotal information. An additional challenge when reporting on issues that concern immigration and asylum authorities in European countries, is that these issues do not necessarily receive a lot of coverage at all, not even from other actors with a focus on the human rights situation.

The project mainly relies on written information from open sources. Additional information was gathered through contact with expert sources on Libya during the autumn of 2014. All quoted sources are provided in the sourced list. Some sources have asked to remain anonymous for reasons of security.

The reporting period is 1 October 2013 until 1 December 2014.

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\(^1\) Cross references between the project reports will refer to *Libya: Security Situation*, *Libya: Vulnerable Groups*, *Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists*, *Libya: Judiciary and Security Sector* and *Libya: Nationality, Registration and Documents*.

\(^2\) Sada, *Sada transliteration system for Arabic*, no date.
2. BACKGROUND

The ouster of Qadhafi’s regime brought with it a historical narrative as well as a strong sense of ownership of the uprising, whereby women, youth movements, militias, tribes, local Libyans and members of diaspora, all, in one or the other way, claim to be legitimate stakeholders in the country's political future. To the outside world, the National Transition Council (NTC) was perceived as leading the uprising. The NTC was formed early, spoke with authority and rapidly achieved broad international recognition. Preoccupied with mustering international support the NTC never fully led the uprising, nor could it establish substantial territorial control in the rest of the country. The scene was therefore left to local power holders. Libya's political landscape has since then undergone a sweeping reconfiguration. The old state's administration and security apparatus collapsed entirely or in part. Temporary or informal arrangements have since been set up to fill the political void until a constitution is in place and permanent institutions are established. The new Libya is deeply divided into different camps, each including a wide range of interests. Local and state actors are among the leading forces to this change. Local councils, tribal forums, militia brigades and Islamist groups have all grown in strength.

Despite numerous efforts to uphold a security sector, Libya continues to see repeated waves of instability and violence. Armed groups and militias – commonly referred to as thuwwar during the uprising – have repeatedly threatened and used force to influence political processes, leading ordinary citizens to question the validity of their elected governments’ efforts to bring about democracy and stability. The governments that have come to power have so far failed to bring these armed groups under control, and Libyans are growing both weary and fearful of the situation as militias continue to serve their own interests, consolidating power bases and aligning with political groups, powerful elites, and others engaged in criminal and extremist violence. The non-state actors that have positioned themselves on the political arena lack both competence and legitimacy to run the country. Citizens, with no clear idea of where to turn have turned inward, to the tribe, to religion, and to themselves.

3. MILITIAS

3.1 Background

The uprising in Libya in 2011, triggered by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, began as a local protest in Benghazi, initiated by unorganized youths, following the arrest of a lawyer. Unlike their counterparts in the neighbouring countries, the youth did not have

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5 Crisis Group, Holding Libya Together; Security Challenges after Qadhafi, 14 December 2011.
6 Lacher, W., Fault Lines of the Revolution, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), May 2014, p. 5-6.
7 Ibid.
social movements, trade unions or social media to back them up. Two decisive factors contributed to the escalation of the uprising. One was the regimes violent response to the protesters, the more protesters were killed, the more quickly political, military and tribal leaders joined in to protect their families and cities. The second was the establishment of the NTC which comprised of elitist leaders that vowed to bring down the Qadhafi regime. As a result, local councils and militia armed groups spontaneously arose throughout Libya to contest the regime on a city-by-city basis. These solidarity networks largely emerged from pre-existing groups within the Libyan society, based on locality, regionalism, ideology and tribe. Those who decided to join in the uprising obtained a firearm, which they often paid for themselves, and literally got into their cars to join the fighting. However, over the course of the fighting small units created to protect the population against regime forces and to ensure delivery of supplies, eventually developed into revolutionary brigades and military councils.

3.2 The Emergence of the Militia Forces

After the Qadhafi regime fell in October 2011, and arms depots were looted, the number of militia groups calling themselves revolutionists – thuwwar – proliferated. Most noticeably in areas and cities where there had been limited fighting, such as of Tripoli. There is no exact estimate as to the number of militias in Libya. Crisis Group calculated that there were between 100 to 300 armed militia groups after the ouster of the Qadhafi regime, and that the number of fighters at the time were estimated to 125,000 individuals. A current estimate maintains that there are approximately 1,600 armed militia groups operating in the country today.

The local dynamics of the militia brigades that emerged in the aftermath of the Libyan uprising varied from region to region. The local rebel structures that emerged in the north-western region – Tripolitania – were essentially autonomous, self-armed and self-trained. Only a few had a military background, but most were civilians. When and where they prevailed, they assumed security and civilian responsibility under the authority of local military councils. As a result, most of the militias are geographically rooted, identified with specific neighbourhoods, towns and cities – such as Zintan and Misrata – rather than joined by ideology, tribal membership or ethnicity. They did not possess a clear political agenda beyond securing territorial control. In addition, the militias of the west have their own narrative to justify their legitimacy, they suffered the most and they also were the ones who did the most to free the capital in 2011.

Noteworthy, the western region was initially a Qadhafi stronghold. This ultimately gave way for confrontations between revolutionary strongholds and tribes that supported the regime. Civilian and military structures arose in cities that had sided with the regime. Similar structures could also be seen in locations that chose to abstain from
entering the struggle but who were compelled to defend themselves against attacks by militia groups.16

In the eastern region – Cyrenaica – the situation was different. Benghazi being a traditional base for anti-regime activity provided army defectors a secure area of operations. The eastern rebellion was built on a strong core of experienced regime opponents and commanders who found a safe haven to defect to. Army defectors held their positions at the eastern frontier, passively observing as events unfolded in the rest of the country. As the region did not come under any direct military threat, it did not experience confrontations between individuals and tribes as was the case in the western part of the country. However, tensions arose between the Islamist camp, which has a stronghold in Benghazi and Darna, and the armed forces and security apparatus. Another aspect to consider with regard to the composition of the eastern region is the impact that local and regional interests have had in mobilising political demands for federalism and regional autonomy.17

The situation in Tripoli was more offensive. There, victory over Qadhafi forces reflected the combined efforts of local residents and various militias from across the country who poured into the capital with the purpose of toppling the regime. As result, a series of parallel, at times uncoordinated chains of command emerged. The presence of multiple militias led to armed clashes as they competed for control over the capital.18

The southern governorate – Fezzan – joined the uprising at a very late stage. Both civilian and military councils that emerged since then are often defined in terms of ethnic and tribal identity. The region has experienced tense ongoing fighting after the fall of the regime, mainly between ethnic tribes of Arabs and Tubus, a tribe of indigenous black African nomads ranging through the eastern Sahara, residing in the areas of Kufra and Sabha. Marginalized by the Qadhafi regime many of the ethnic militias fought to bring the regime down. Ethnic tribes are now competing with Arab tribes over control of the abundant resources in the region as well as the traffic of its trade routes (both licit and illicit). The porous borders and natural resources (water and oil) of southern Libya make it strategically vital. The region also constitutes a passage linking Mediterranean North Africa with the Sahel, and then Sub-Saharan Africa beyond that.19

3.3 Politicalization of the Militia groups

Since 2012 the militias, or coalitions of militia forces, have gradually gained strength as political forces, and elected representatives within the General National Congress (GNC), increasingly rally their support. Libya’s key political parties – the Justice and Construction Party (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood), the National Force Alliance, and the Loyalty to the Martyrs’ Blood bloc (Kutlat al-Wafa li-Damm al-Shuhada) – do not have any official armed wings. Instead they are affiliated with various militia groups through common grassroots networks of kin, local, tribe, as well as the religious and ideological cleavages that sustain them.20

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.

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The political divisions prevailing in Libya today are commonly characterized as secularist versus Islamists or Misrata versus Zintan. However, to do so would be to simplify matters. The ties that bind these armed groups with political actors are more complex. It is more related to patronage and exclusions that go back to the old regime. Here, issues such as settling scores and the exclusion and isolation of the remnants of the old regime are key components that forge these alliances. This was clearly illustrated when the Justice and Construction Party and the Martyr's bloc resorted to militia forces to push the Political Isolation Law – which stipulates the ban of officials from the Qadhafi era from government employment – into effect in May 2013. Similar tactics were used to remove former Prime Minister Ali Zaydan from power. Another example is when the Islamist-backed president in the GNC, Nuri Abu Sahmayn, established the Libyan revolutionaries 'Operations Room', an umbrella grouping of Islamists and Misratian dominated militias, to counter the influence and power of the Zintanian militias in Tripoli.

In conclusion, politicians draw support from militias to push forward their agendas and militias secure supporters in the government or ministries to consolidate their power.

3.4 Integrating the militia within state institutions

In light of the above mentioned it is clear that the growing influence and strength of the militias are posing great challenges to the security situation, as the government grapples in its efforts to contain them.

Programs set to Disarm, Disband and Rehabilitate militias – also known as DDR – have mainly focused on incorporating these fighting units within state institutions. Integration offered the prospect of upholding the legitimacy of the fighters by infusing them within the police and army, thereby bringing the armed groups under government control, and strengthening the weakened security sector. In theory, the idea was sound, offering salaries, purposeful engagement, and containment. The state, however, failed to establish clear guidance for the integration. This disarrayed process failed to demobilize armed groups, and instead produced a multitude of security sectors whereby whole units were incorporated within the ministries of defense and interior respectively.

The large majority of the armed groups have been incorporated into two umbrella coalitions, the Libya Shield Force (LSF) (see 4.5.2) and the Supreme Security Committees (SSC) (see 4.5.3). Both were established as transitional security forces, placed under the authority of the Ministry of Defense's Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Interior, respectively. A significant minority of the militia groups have become part of the Preventive Security Apparatus, a counterintelligence force under the Chief of Staff, or the border guard (including the National Guard, a sub-organization in charge of guarding governmental institutions and other vital installations).

22 Ibid.
23 Lacher, W., Fault Lines of the Revolution, SWP, May 2014, p. 27.

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In theory, these units, particularly the SSC and the LSF, were designated to supplement the regular army and police. In reality, however, militias incorporated in these SSC and the LFS act with a high degree of autonomy. Some pursue agendas that are ideological and political; others have outlooks that are local, individualistic, and occasionally criminal.26

This display of autonomy was demonstrated in the controversy over the command of the border guards. Acting Deputy Defense Minister at the time, Siddiq Mabruk, had during his time in office refused to incorporate the unit under the Chief of Staff. This prompted the intervention of the Minister of Defense, Muhammad al-Barghati, who pushed through the change. The situation then escalated in January 2013, whereby the Minister's convoy came under attack by fighters adhering to Mabruk.27

The Warriors Affairs Commission (WAC) was another promising integration effort set up during the transitional government (NTC) (that governed between March 2011 and July 2012). The commission aimed at registering and assessing the competencies and objectives of militia fighters. However, the commission received limited cooperation, particularly from Misrata- and Tripoli-based militia groups as well as from the ministries of Interior and Defense.28

Part of the reason to the state's failure to integrate the militias, as well as the prevailing inconsistencies within the security sector's chain of command, can be attributed to the weakness of the regular armed forces. Neglected under Qadhafi, who feared their potential for coups, the Libyan armed forces remain extremely ill-equipped, poorly trained, and bloated at the senior ranks. There is little internal coordination between the various militia groups. Efforts to recruit and train forces are patchy and inconsistent. In addition, the armed forces frequently have hostile relations with the LSF and other militia groups. The police force is also ill-equipped to handle difficult and hazardous policing tasks (such as counter-narcotics operations).29

Another key error carried out in the effort to integrate militia groups is the state's decision to integrate them as intact groups rather than individuals. To begin with, commanders were tasked with compiling lists of group members, who were then assigned government identification and salaries. This resulted in the registration of numbers far beyond those who realistically fought in the uprising. Commanders inflated numbers for profit and influence. As fighters were not vetted as individuals the state was not able to carry out background checks, meaning that a number of individuals poorly suited to roles in security provision, including some with serious criminal records, slipped into the ranks. Significantly, group integration preserved the internal structures and maintained the fighters' allegiances to their commanders and groups. Consequently, integrated fighters continued to identify themselves with their groups rather than with the new state institutions they represent. By doing so the state failed to establish well-defined roles and responsibilities for the newly recruited fighters.30

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27 Lacher, W., Fault Lines of the Revolution, SWP, May 2014, p. 27.
Furthermore, the upper ranks within the Ministry of Defense and Interior were dominated by Islamists with their own set agendas. As a result, both ministries chose to recruit controversial Islamist figures to command units within the LSF and the SSC. The same applied to the intelligence, for example, the Deputy Intelligence Chief, Mustafa Nuh, is a renowned Islamist.31

Attendance and salaries has also become subject of concern to the state as there have been reports of recruits in the police, judicial police, and military receiving salaries regardless of attendance. Individuals in the SSC and LSF earn higher wages than police and army cadets for less work, though some adjustments have been recently attempted. Given the sudden oversupply of manpower from integration, many recruits work in shifts one day on, followed by four days off. Free time has allowed many to work other jobs, collecting multiple salary, some even repeat registering with multiple integration programs.32

Militia groups also saw little incentive to break down their powerful command structures and integrate into state ones after it became apparent that their lack of formal security training and experience would compel them to serve in lower grades within security institutions. Having wielded significant power during the uprising, militias were reluctant to assume lower ranks subservient to more experienced, old-order police, whom they viewed as representatives of the old regime. The SSC has struggled to address these concerns and to restore the integration process by making space for some militia commanders in police leadership roles.33

Many of the militia commanders in charge of new institutions have a clear objective: the removal of the remnants of the former regime (azlam). Others have chosen to pursue different agendas, for example pursuing an explicit Islamist agenda. This in turn has fueled up tensions, at times violence, between various factions aiming to control the security sector. This has been particularly the case in Benghazi after the attacks on the American Consulate in September 2012. Noteworthy, unlike the rest of the country the north eastern region remained relatively intact, therefore allowing the old army structures to survive, in comparison to other parts were the remnants of the old regime were confronted by the new forces forged during the uprising.34 The rise of former general Haftar can be attributed to inter-militia fighting as he set to consolidate power from various factions within the army as well as the militias by posing as a defender of the army’s interests, and accusing Islamist militias of preventing the rebuilding of the armed forces.35

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
4. MAJOR MILITIA GROUPS

4.1 Zintan Militias

Zintan, an Arab town in the heart of the predominantly Berber/Amazigh Nafusa Mountains, was never conquered by Qadhafi’s forces. Benefitting from its proximity to the Tunisian border, it became a center for rebel military organizations from neighboring areas, hence allowing it to build one of the strongest, non-Islamist, Arab militia groups in the country. Contrary to other Arab, Amazigh militias, the Zintan militias did not withdraw from Tripoli following the fall of the regime in 2011. Over the years they have enjoyed extensive power. They contained their leverage over the international airport as well as the capture of Sayf al-Islam Qadhafi.36

The turf divisions between the Zintan militias and their rival Misratan armed groups brought forth a shaky peace, interrupted by sporadic clashes. However, the arrangement always paved ground for violence. The Zintan militias began using their control over the international airport to receive weapons from abroad.37

However, their power gradually dwindled following the removal of Prime Minister Ali Zaydan from power in 2013, and lately when they lost control of Tripoli airport in July 2014 to the pro-Islamist alliance Libya Dawn.38 The militia forces are now trying to retake their position in a joint effort with Haftar’s Operation Dignity.39

The following militias are affiliated to the Zintan militias:

4.1.1 Zintan Revolutionary Military Council (ZRMC)

The ZRMC is aligned with the non-Islamist current in Libyan politics. The ZRMC consists of 23 Nafusa and Zintan mountain militia groups and is considered one of the powerful and by some one of the well-organized groups in Libya. They are led by Mukhtar Khalifa Shahub. The militia’s capture and detention of Sayf al-Islam Qadhafi further strengthens their position.40

The ZRMC only accepts recruits who can demonstrate that they have no affiliation to the Qadhafi regime in any way. Moreover, the mix of civil volunteers and former members of the Libyan Army, which make up the armed group, is highly hierarchical.41

4.1.2 Tripoli Revolutionary Council (TRC)

The TRC participated in the battle in Tripoli against Qadhafi’s forces. It is headed by Abdullah Nakir. The Zintan militias maintain that the council is not affiliated to them because the TRC wants to retain its reputation of being a Tripoli based militia.42

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41 Finnuci, F., Libya: Military actors and militias, Global Security Organization, no date.

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4.1.3 **The Qa’qa’ Brigade**

The Brigade is considered the most organized and best equipped government sanctioned militia group in Tripoli. This is attributed to the preferential treatment it received during the former Minister of Defense’s, Usama Juwayli, time in office. In addition, it is also considered as the most professionally trained group because it is comprised of officers and combatants from Qadhafi’s renowned elite force the 32nd Brigade (aka Khamis Brigade). It is headed by Uthman Mulayqita. The group is tasked to protect senior officials and government ministers. Despite its pro-government standpoint it is also reputed for its involvement in illicit arms smuggling and narcotic dealing activities as well as kidnapping.\(^{43}\) Officially the group was affiliated under the army’s chief of staff, providing security at the border frontiers along the country’s porous southwest borders and guarding oil installations in the southern oil fields.\(^{44}\)

They oppose what they see as an unacceptable level of Islamist influence in the government, and in February of this year they joined the Sawa’iqa brigade in pressuring members of the GNC to resign. The brigade further demanded the indictment of the GNC representatives.\(^{45}\)

4.1.4 **The Sawa’iqa Brigade**

Originally from Zintan, the group is considered to be the most heavily armed in Libya. It took part in the fight for Tripoli in 2011 and has since been tasked with providing personal protection to the former Prime Minister as well as senior figures. The group is currently headed by Imad al-Tarabulsi and is also known to keep a low profile.\(^{46}\)

However, it did recently take part in the fighting in Zawiya against Islamist led militias and the LSF.\(^{47}\)

4.2 **Tripoli Militias**

4.2.1 **Tripoli Military Council and Tripoli Local Council**

The Tripoli Military Council (TMC) is comprised of former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The council has been criticized for receiving support from Qatar which also attributed to its low popularity. The council’s former leader Abdalhakim Bilhajj, with roots in Tripoli, was also a former combatant in Afghanistan. Bilhajj left the council to run for office for his party, Hizb al-Watan, during the elections of 2012 but was not successful. The council did dissolve for some time and many of its former fighters were consolidated within the SSC which aligned with the Tripoli Local Council (TLC). However, it reemerged again following the attack on the GNC by protestors in March 2014, when the president of the congress, Abu Samhayn, ordered

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the TMCs commander, Isa Badir, to secure the capital from ‘illegitimate’ armed groups. The TMC is currently led by Sadat Badri, who has since been pushing for the Tripolization of the capital’s security forces. However, Badri’s affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood makes him unpopular with the population in the capital.48

4.2.2 Nawasi Brigade (Crime Combating Unit)

The Nawasi Brigade is a Salafi-led special unit affiliated with the SSC. It enjoys a relative degree of autonomy. The leader is Abdarra’uf Karah. The group mainly focuses on combating drug- and alcohol related crimes, as well as other non-Islamic conduct.49

4.2.3 Special Deterrent Force

The Special Deterrent Force is an anti-crime unit within the Ministry of Interior. The unit controls and combats alcohol production and has been known to seize weapons and arms.50 The Force has close ties with Islamist groups in Tripoli. It is headed by police captain Haytham al-Tajuri. His appointment was part of the government’s demobilization of the militias by giving its leaders the opportunity to switch to high levels within the security sector.51

4.3 Misrata Militias

The Misrata militias comprise of over 200 militias with a force of 40,000 fighters. It is by far the largest fighting force in post-Qadhafi Libya. Their prime rival is the Zintan militias. The militias stood up to Qadhafi forces' three-month siege of Misrata, as its citizens arranged themselves into units to defend the city. These militia groups played a decisive role in the battle for Tripoli and the liberation of Sirt as well as the killing of Qadhafi. Mistratian militias have over time felt marginalized and isolated by the Zaydan-government which prompted them to forge alliances with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. The militia’s discontent with the government further strengthens its ties with the GNC.52

The Misrata militias do not originate from Tripoli. Their continuing presence in the capital after the uprising has incited confrontations. In November 2013 they clashed with demonstrators protesting against non-local militias. The protest that started off peaceful had a deadly outcome when militias attacked the neighborhood of Gharghur, targeting the homes of former Qadhafi officials.53

A large number of Misrata militias are integrated within LSF in the western region of the country. Others have been assigned to provide security to government officials.54


50 Finnuci, F., Libya: Military actors and militias, Global Security Organization, no date.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 36.
4.4 Bengazi Militias

As Bengazi did not encounter extensive confrontations with armed militias, its armed forces remain fairly intact. The militias that rose to power in the post-Qadhafi era can be divided into two groups, Islamist and non-Islamist militias. The security sector that emerged after the fall of the Qadhafi regime in 2011 was consequently marked by a tenuous division between ‘official’ forces embodied in army units, and semi-official Islamist militias.55

4.4.1 Non-Islamist Bengazi Based Militias

4.4.1.1 Al-Sa’iqa Brigade

The Sa’iqa is one of Qadhafi’s former elite forces. It is tribal affiliated and made up of prominent eastern families. Members of the Ubaydat, Awaqir, and Baraghita tribes make up the overall majority of al-Sa’iqa’s rank and file. The force was dispatched by Qadhafi to crackdown on the Islamist uprising in the east during the late 1990s. The Sa’iqa force was amongst the first to join the rebel forces in the uprising. However, its commander, Colonel Wanis Bukhamada, declined from undertaking policing activities after the uprising. As a special force, they were not qualified or equipped for urban policing. However, with violence escalating in the summer of 2013, the regular police proved incapable of containing the situation. As a result, Bukhamada mobilized the Sa’iqa’s reserve forces to quell the fighting. The group fought running gun battles with the jihadi Ansar al-Sharia, an imposition that rendered him unpopular with other Islamists groups.56

Bukhamada became the effective military governor of Bengazi in 2013, charged with coordinating the efforts of government agencies and disparate ‘registered’ armed groups. Noteworthy, most of Bukhamada’s success stems from his tribal pedigree within the Magharba tribe rather than from his rank. This became apparent in early 2014 when major tribes pledged their allegiance to him, vowing not to claim retribution in accordance with tribal custom if any of their kin were killed by his forces.57

4.4.1.2 Army of Cyrenaica (AC)

The AC is the military arm of the Transitional Council of Cyrenaica (TCC), with Ahmad Zubayr al-Sanussi as its figurehead. The TCC wants autonomy for Libya’s eastern region and to implement a federal system of government. The AC is led by Colonel Hamid Hassi. The group consists of former army officers, discontent by the marginalized treatment they received from militia leaders who came to dominate the security institutions following the ouster of the Qadhafi regime. In order to draw attention to the federalist cause, the forces set up a road block at Wadi al-Ahmar in June 2012, a symbolic point on Libya’s coastal highway, to mark the historical border point between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. This action may have been an attempt to draw attention to the federal cause however it did not get the attention it had hoped for.58

57 Ibid.

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The AC is paid by the government.59

4.4.1.3 Cyrenaica Protection Force (CPF)

The CPF is the armed wing of the federalist Political Bureau of Cyrenaica, which split from the TCC in May 2013. After the split the Political Bureau set up a separate government for the Cyrenaica region. The CPF is said to host around 20,000 fighters.60

The CPF retains good cooperation with the AC. Ibrahim Jadhran, head of the Political Bureau, also heads the CPF. In July 2013 he led the occupation of the oil terminals at Ras Lanuf, Zwaytina and Sidra, in the eastern part of the country. The eight months seizure of the oil terminals, and installations, has had a detrimental impact on the economy as well as on the country’s progress towards constitutional governance. Jadhran was appointed head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) for central Libya following the uprising. His decision to abandon his post and to establish the Political Bureau of Cyrenaica is mainly attributed to the lack of transparency, unfair distribution, and wide corruption within the oil sector. This also gained him popularity in the eastern and southern parts of the country, where the bulk of the oil industry lies.61

Jadhran enjoys tribal support from the prominent tribes in the eastern and southern regions; Ubaydat, Awaqir, al-Drursa, al-Bar’asa, al-Magharba, Zway, Hassi, Qaran, Minfa and the Tubu ethnic group.62

4.4.2 Islamist Benghazi Based Militias

The Islamists militias largely stem from returning Libyan fighters who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. Upon their return to Libya, they became engaged in anti-Qadhafi activity in the 1990s. Together they came to form the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) dedicated to overthrow of the Qadhafi regime. Jihadist and Salafi anti-Qadhafi activists were mainly concentrated in eastern Libya and Darna in particular.63 This is relatively surprising in a sense, as eastern Libya is traditionally the home of the Sanussi sufi order, which is adversative to Wahhabii/Salafi/Jihadi doctrines. On the other hand, the emergence of these doctrines also reflects on the marginalization of the eastern regions by the Qadhafi regime. Another contributing factor to the garnered support Islamist groups received was the general sentiment amongst certain segments within the population in eastern Libya that they were being sidelined by the NTC and then later by the GNC. The lack of official government presence allowed these groups to strengthen communal ties by providing social services and other charitable – da’wa – activities. In addition, many Islamist groups opposed the GNC’s decision to train troops abroad, which they perceived as anti-Islamic.64

The most prominent Islamist militias are as follows:

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 31-32.
64 Ibid.
4.4.2.1 Ansar al-Sharia Libya (ASL)-Partisans of Islamic law - Sharia

ASL is a Salafist-jihadist militia based in Benghazi. The ASL initially manifested as a militia force during the 2011 uprising and gained prominence following the death of Qadhafi. The ASL comprises of former fighters from several militia groups from eastern Libya, such as the Abu Ubayda al-Jarah militia, the Malik Brigades and the 17 of February Brigades. Their number is estimated to 5000 fighters. The organization calls for the full implementation of Islamic Sharia and the creation of an Islamic state. Its strict and radical doctrine has rendered it unpopular with other Islamists groups. As a result the Islamic coalition leading the fight in Tripoli – Libya Dawn – has rejected ASL’s call to join the coalition, proclaiming that the ASL’s struggle is that of an extremist nature, opposing democratic legitimacy.

The ASL took advantage of the lack of state control by building local communal ties, which strengthened its ability to operate in several locations other than Benghazi. In the aftermath of the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi in September 2012 a major rebranding began by changing the group’s name from Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. Though at the time ASL was only active in Benghazi, the group changed its name to try and signify itself as a national movement. In addition, ASL also began focusing on charitable – da’wa – activities to garner more support and alter local perceptions.

The ASL is not perceived as a fixed organization but is instead seen as a coalition of Islamist and Jihadist groups active in eastern Libya. The ASL is mostly associated by two groups, Ansar al-Sharia respectively in Benghazi and Darna. The group’s branch in Benghazi is led by Muhammad al-Zahawi, whilst the branch in Darna is commanded by Sufyan bin Qumu. Both leaders were active in Afghanistan. Allegedly, Qumu was once a driver to Osama bin Laden and formerly detained in Guantanamo. Muhammad al-Zahawi was imprisoned in the Abu Salim prison at the same time as Abu Khatla who was implicated in the attack against the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi in September 2012.

ASL views Sharia as the only form of justice and uses tactics such as bombings, suicide bombings, kidnappings, attacks on security forces associated with the Libyan Government and assassinations. ASL is also associated with assisting and training regional jihadists on Libyan territory, as well as smuggling weapons and fighters.

The ASL is renowned for its charity service – da’wa – as well as proto-governance efforts. It has provided support from its base in Benghazi to other areas such as Tripoli, Ajdabiya, Sirt, Darna and the Gulf of Sidra and other smaller locations. The organization provides food, medical care, religious education and other services to the poor and needy. The group has also mediated disputes between tribes.

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65 Irshaid, F., Profile: Libya’s Ansar al-Sharia, BBC News, 13 June 2014.
67 Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC), Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, no date.
69 TRAC, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, no date.
4.4.2 17 February Martyrs Brigade

The group is an Islamist militia with affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is considered one of the biggest armed groups in eastern Libya. The group consists of 12 battalions and has between 1,500–3,500 fighters. The group, which is based in Benghazi, is funded by the Ministry of Defense as it has on occasion been deployed, as part of the LSF, to quell clashes in eastern Libya and Kufra in the south. ASL and Raf’allah al-Sahati militias are said to originate from this militia group. Its leader Fawzi Bukatif is currently serving as Libya’s Ambassador to Uganda and is seen as a key figure in managing Libya’s investments in Africa.

The group is also suspected of being involved in a number of assassinations. It recently joined the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries that was formed to confront the National Libyan Army under General Khalifa Haftar’s Command.

4.4.3 Raf’allah al-Sahati Brigade

This militia group, originating from the 17 of February brigade, is a Jihadist group based in Benghazi. It is considered one of the powerful militias in eastern Libya. The group which is led by Mohammed al-Gharabi has been deployed by the Ministry of Defense to eastern Libya as well as Kufra in the south.

4.4.4 Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade

Mainly based in Darna, the group comprises of former LF1G fighters. Its main aim is to impose Sharia doctrine. The group was integrated within the SSC in 2012. It has been known to have targeted former officials from the Qadhafi era. It is also involved in arms and narcotic smuggling.

4.5 State Affiliated Bodies

4.5.1 Libya Revolutionaries’ Operations Room (LROR)

The LROR was established in May 2013. Amongst the politicized militia groups, none has had such an impact on the stability of the country as the LROR. The LROR is essentially a coalition of armed factions that was established for the purpose to pass the Political Isolation Law and to oust the Prime Minister Ali Zaydan from power. The group is described as Islamist, Mistratian-dominated and anti-Zintan as well as anti-federalist. The group has also drawn recruits from diverse ethnic groups, such as the Tubu in Kufra and the Amazigh in the west. Its biggest challenge is that it incorporates entire security units from both the Ministry of Interior as well as the Ministry of Defense. For example the LROR’s branch in Benghazi includes members from the 17 of February Brigades as well as members from the Raf’allah al-Sahati and Umar Mukhtar Brigade. All these groups are also affiliated to the LFS under the Chief of Staff.

72 Ibid., p. 31.
73 Redress Information & Analysis, Watch: Eastern Libya’s top terrorist group, 17 February Brigade, routed by national army, 24 October 2014.
74 TRAC, The 17 of February Brigade, no date.
75 Ibid.; Finnuci, F., Libya: Military actors and militias, Global Security Organization, no date.
76 TRAC, Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade, no date; Wehrey, F., Libya’s Militia Menace, Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2012.
addition, the LROR is known to pay higher salaries, which attracts recruits from the police force to join their ranks.\(^{78}\)

### 4.5.2 The Libya Shield Force (LSF)

The LSF was established in 2012. The force is comprised of 12 divisions,\(^{79}\) covering three geographical areas; East, West and Center.\(^{80}\) It is said to incorporate between 6,000 and 12,000 fighters. The force consists of fragmented Islamist militias, based mainly in Benghazi, Khums and Misrata, but also in Zliten, Bani Walid, Zawiya, Gharyan, Tarhuna, and Sabrata. It controls coastal areas with Islamist groups, but most of its firepower comes from Misrata. The majority of the groups that chose to integrate within LSF remained largely intact. The Chief of Staff entrusted the units, instead of the regular army, to restoring stability. However, units and divisions operated differently and were not entirely neutral in their approach towards the fighting parties.\(^{81}\) It is currently aligned with the Libya Dawn coalition, aiming to purge the country of tribal and local armed factions.\(^{82}\)

Many of the powerful commanders within the armed militias undertook the LSF project as a way to avoid incorporation within the regular army. In the past two years the LSF has grown in power. Members of the LSF retain higher salaries which has been an incentive for many to join.\(^{83}\)

The individual Shield divisions comprise of local young men who reflect on the provincial agendas of the regions they represent. Largely, the divisions are composed of Islamist militias, like for example in Benghazi where the Shield’s seventh division is composed of Raf‘allah al-Sahati companies.\(^{84}\) Disagreement and fissures are common, whereby new Shield divisions emerge in response to personality conflicts amongst commanders.\(^{85}\)

### 4.5.3 The Supreme Security Committee (SSC)

The SSC was founded by the Ministry of Interior first in Tripoli in 2011 and thereafter throughout the country in 2012. It quickly evolved into a national structure, with branches in major cities. Reportedly, there are approximately 70 armed groups in Tripoli with their own forces and divisions. These units are drawn from various neighborhoods in Tripoli, each reflecting from their background, such as family structure and political affiliation.\(^{86}\) The Committee succeeded in incorporating a large number of militia groups attracted by the relatively high salary incentives that were offered. Their numbers were estimated to 131,000 in July 2012. Reportedly, the SCC

\(^{78}\) Ibid.

\(^{79}\) Ibid, p. 8.


\(^{81}\) Ibid., p. 31; Finnuci, F., *Libya: Military actors and militias*, Global Security Organization, no date.


\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{85}\) Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 11.
has been partly dismantled since mid-2014 whereby some of its members, approximately 80,000, have been integrated within the police force. Despite efforts, the SSC is proving hard to disband as it is difficult to place the remaining resources. This is mainly attributed to the prevailing security conditions in the country and the absence of a viable police force as well as lack of other job opportunities elsewhere.87

The composition of the SCCs differs from one city to another and from one unit to the other.88 The balance of control between the different SCC units and other unaffiliated groups, police and army vary from one location to the other. In Benghazi for example the SCC basically diminished following the attack on the U.S. Consulate.89 In Tripoli the forces gained a reputation as a Muslim stronghold. They have been revered as morality police, attacking Sufi shrines and enforcing strict Islamic mores on gender relations as well as forbidding drugs.90

While some of the groups are composed of militia fighters stemming from militia groups that participated in the uprising, other militias emerged after the fall of the regime.91 In addition, many local SSC units act independently, often with an explicit mandate to apprehend former regime supporters.92

The organization is renowned for its bloated chain of command and for competition between local and national branches.93

5. **OPERATION DIGNITY VS. LIBYA DAWN AND THE SHURA COUNCIL OF BENGHAZI REVOLUTIONARIES**

The Libyan National Army, led by General Khalifa Haftar, came to prominence in February 2014, when Haftar called for the suspension of the government, which was promptly rejected by the authorities. In May 2014, his militias launched an offensive against Islamists in Benghazi, under the name of Operation Dignity (*Amaliyyat al-Karama*), after gathering support from army and air force units. Haftar also rallied support from Benghazi militia forces: such as the Sa’iqa Brigade, and the Cyrenaica Defence Force. In the south Haftar gained support from ethnic Tubu and Tuareg fighters as well as armed members from the Baraghitha tribe. From the west, Zintan-based militias joined, such as Qa’qa’, Madani and Sawa’iq.94 Operation Dignity set to eradicate Islamist militias whom Benghazi’s residents blame for the wave of bombings and assassinations that have been taking place over the past years. Haftar’s offensive

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87 Ibid.


90 Ibid.


92 Ibid.


also prompted the removal of the Islamist-dominated Libyan parliament through new elections which took place in June 2014.\textsuperscript{95}

Haftar’s movement stems from deep disenchantment by former officers, particularly from the east, with the GNC’s collusion with Islamist armed groups. The GNC was not providing funds or support for the army in its struggle to uphold security in Benghazi.\textsuperscript{96}

In July 2014, Misratan militias formed an alliance known as Libya Dawn (\textit{Fajr Libya})\textsuperscript{97} together with supporters from the Muslim Brotherhood party and Islamist militias - LROR, LSF and the Tripoli brigade under Abdalhakim Bilhajj. Joint attacks carried out against rival militias, Zintan, nominally aligned with Haftar, resulted in the seizure of the international airport as well as most parts of the Libyan capital, Tripoli.\textsuperscript{98}

The subsequent fighting between the two sides has further contributed to polarizing the political scene. The legitimacy of the recently elected House of Representatives is contested, and the government was forced to relocate to Tobruk after Misratan militias seized larger parts of the capital. Subsequently, those in control of the capital have installed a rival ‘salvation government’.\textsuperscript{99} The UN made attempts in September 2014 to bring about a ceasefire with no success.\textsuperscript{100} Special Representative to the UN Secretary General in Libya has made attempts to initiate talks between the parties in an effort to bring about discussions on confidence-building measures and assume a dialogue between parties. New talks are set to resume in December 2014 in the hope of bringing about a new dialogue with all parties in the conflict.\textsuperscript{101}

In June 2014 Benghazi Islamists groups formed a coalition, the Shura Revolutionary Council (SRC), in a joint effort to confront Haftar’s attacks. The Council includes the following militias; the 17 of February brigade, ASL, Ra’allah al-Sahati, and Libya Shield 1 – a militia close to the Muslim Brotherhood, centered in Benghazi, with close ties to ASL.\textsuperscript{102} The ASL was earlier spurned from joining the Libya Dawn coalition as the latter chose to distance itself from the ASL due to its extremist nature.\textsuperscript{103}

6. **TRIBES/ETHNIC GROUPS**

6.1 **Background**

There are 140 tribes in Libya. Approximately 30 to 50 tribes are thought to play an important social and political role in the composition of Libyan society today.\textsuperscript{104} Tribal

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\textsuperscript{95} Shennib, G., \textit{Libyan PM says government safe after army statement}, Reuters, 14 February, 2014.


\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{100} The National, \textit{Islamist-allied militias in Libya reject UN truce talks}, 30 September 2014.

\textsuperscript{101} Reuters, \textit{UN Mission calls for new talks between Libyan groups on Dec}, 3 December 2014.


\textsuperscript{103} AFP, \textit{Libya Dawn Islamists reject ‘Ansal al Sharia terror’}, 26 August 2014.

\textsuperscript{104} Varvelli, A., \textit{The Role of Tribal Dynamics in the Libyan Future}, Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (ISPI), May 2013.

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influences are extremely important, particularly since the 1970s, where tribal affiliation was instrumental in endorsing Qadhafi’s political power by ensuring local and regional power for tribal leaders. Tribal functions were formalized in the mid-1990s through Popular Social Committees that further empowered tribal leaders, but also made them responsible for any subversive activity by members of their tribes. Qadhafi consolidated his power around three main tribes, his own, Qadhadhfa, Maqariha – which he was affiliated to through marriage – and Warfalla which was the largest. These tribe members, as well as others who were loyal to the Qadhafi regime, were given high positions within the armed forces, police and intelligence service. The power base was located west of the country, which also explains why the former regime easily lost control of the eastern part of the country at the early stages of the uprising.

Tribal alliances continue to play a significant role in post-Qadhafi Libya. Libyans continue to identify strongly with their tribal networks. Due to their experience as producers of order and conflict mediators, tribal leaders played a dominant role in the local transitional councils that merged after the uprising. They were also instrumental in transforming militia groups into disciplined tribal militias. Their leadership skills and local knowledge has also won them prominent positions within the government. Local and tribal interests are therefore likely to continue to feature strongly in the future Libya.

6.2 Ethnic Identity

The tribal composition of Libya is both complex and versified. It is divided in accordance to ethnic identity; Arabs, Amazigh/Berber, Tubu and Tawargha.

6.2.1 Arabs

The ethnic Arabs of Libya are those who descended from Bani Hilal and Bani Salim tribes. The tribes were brought with their families from the Arabian Peninsula (via Egypt) by the Fatimid rulers in the 10th century to assist in containing the Berber resistance.

The major Arab centers of today’s Libya include Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, Zawiya, Sabrata, Khums, al-Bayda, Darna, Tubruq and other smaller villages and settlements along the coast and in the interior.

Genetic studies further claim that there are also groups of Arabized Berbers – that is Berbers who adopted the Arab tongue.

6.2.2 Amazigh/Berber

The indigenous Amazigh population is mainly concentrated in the western part of the country, in the coastal areas of Zuwaran and in the Nafusa/Western Mountains. The

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109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
Amazigh/Berber group was culturally and politically marginalized during the Qadhafi regime. Legislation (Law 24) banned Amazigh/Berbers from giving their children non-Arabic names.\textsuperscript{111} In addition, authorities were also reluctant to provide official documentation attesting their citizenship. This background is probably the main driving force behind ethnic Amazigh/Berbers choice to participate in the uprising.\textsuperscript{112}

However, there was a strong uneasiness that the group would push their demands for autonomy further after the fall of the Qadhafi regime. There have been indications of ongoing discrimination by Arabs towards Amazigh/Berber communities in the western part of the country, particularly in Zuwarah and in the Arab towns of al-Jamil, Raqdalin and Zaltan.\textsuperscript{113}

\subsection*{6.2.3 Tuareg}

The Tuareg are an Amazigh/Berber nomadic pastoralist group. Other than Libya they can be found in Niger, Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali. The Tuareg are important actors as they influence the trading routes along Libya’s borders. Due to their cross-border tribal affiliations, they are often regarded as Qadhafi supporters because of the increased presence of ‘mercenaries’, brought in by the Qadhafi regime from other parts of North Africa to quell the uprising in 2011.\textsuperscript{114}

Like the Amazigh/Berber, Tuaregs were also marginalized by the former regime. There are perceptions that the Tuaregs sided with Qadhafi during the uprising in order to increase their political and cultural standing in Libya. This perception has continued to bring about tensions between Tuaregs and Arab communities, particularly in the south, such as Sabha and Ghadamis.\textsuperscript{115}

\subsection*{6.2.4 Tubu}

The Tubu are black indigenous tribes located in southern Libya, Chad and Niger. Their main population centers are found in Kufra and Sabha. As the case with the Amazigh/Berber and Tuaregs, Tubu were also subject to cultural and political discrimination by the old regime. Their cross-border tribal links have also been subject of controversy with regard to their nationality. The incentives of the oil industry drew many Tubus from neighboring Chad and Niger to immigrate to Libya.\textsuperscript{116}

The Tubu population stem from oil rich provinces, as well as lucrative trafficking/transit routes from sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean North. Territorial and border control over the trafficking routes have brought about tensions between the Tubu and Arab-Berber communities residing in the area which at times have resulted in protracted clashes between the groups.\textsuperscript{117}

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\end{flushright}
6.2.5 Tawargha

The Tawargha originate from black Africans who were brought to Libya. Following their emancipation they settled in the east of Misrata.\(^{118}\) There are those who would argue that the Tawargha were given preferential treatment during the Qadhafi era and that Tawargha fighters participated in the siege of Misrata.\(^{119}\) Other sources claim that the Tawargha were lured to side with the Qadhafi regime as it incited them to avenge the years of enslavement their ancestors suffered at the hands of earlier captors and masters.\(^{120}\) Consequently, entire populations, up to 30,000 inhabitants, were driven out of their communities by avenging Misrata militias.\(^{121}\) They are now displaced, residing in camps in Tripoli and Benghazi. Others attribute the attacks on the Tawargha communities to the fact that they are black Africans and therefore perceived as Qadhafi-backed ‘mercenaries’ that participated in the fighting during the uprising.\(^{122}\)

6.3 Libya’s Tribal Dynamics

Tribal influences played a key role on both sides of the conflict and also shaped the course of the conflict during the uprising in 2011. Political mobilization and military organization occurred along tribal and local lines. Alliances and coalitions were forged along family, tribal and local interests and grew more pronounced when the common goal to overthrow the regime became evident. Tribal leaders and other prominent tribal figures are experienced conflict mediators, well versed in customary law – *urf*. Their local knowledge of regional dynamics earned them an important role in local transitional councils as well as city based military councils. In some instances they were also instrumental in upholding discipline within militia ranks.\(^{123}\) However, it is also important to recognize that the mobilization of the armed militias did not depend entirely on tribal affiliation, but also on the basis of cities and towns.\(^{124}\)

Even if tribal ties have diminished within the Libyan society as a result of urbanization, it still continues to be a part of the Libyan identity. Tribes are not regarded as collective actors ruled by leaders, but rather as segmented sub-tribes, lineages and extended families. And it is particularly the latter that maintain the power relations between and within tribes. Tribal identity represents a common nominator for Libyans’ way of life. Tribal culture contains ethics, norms and the adoption of values that make up concrete institutions and procedures. The most important of these is customary law (*urf*) and the gathering of leading men in *murbu’* (the men’s room or guestroom in tribal houses).\(^{125}\)

Tribal structures still remain strong, and tribal institutions have contributed to providing order in the political and security vacuum that prevailed after the fall of the Qadhafi regime. People’s vote are indirectly guided by tribal/family ties. The majority

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124 Ibid.
of independent representatives in the 2012 elections represented the interests of individuals, families or tribes.\textsuperscript{126}

During the uprising tribes attained both arms and experience and therefore gained local influence and territorial control. Minority groups like Amazigh, Tuareg and Tubu have gained significant freedom through de-facto self-rule.\textsuperscript{127} In the northwest, Libyans have identified with one of two rival alliances; a ‘lower’ tribal alliance along the coast, including Misrata, Zawiya, and some of the Farjan tribes, and an ‘upper’ which consists largely of Bedouin alliances in the mountains and also further south including Zintan, Warfallah, Qadhadhfa, Maqarha and Warshafana tribes. The northeast maintains tribal alliances to Operation Dignity. Supporters include some of the Farjan tribes – which Haftar belongs to – in the Gulf of Sirt, Maghariba, Ubaydat and al-Bar‘asa. Some of these tribes also support federalism like Maghariba, Hassi and al-Awaqir. The extremist groups in the Gulf of Sirt and the northeast try to downplay tribal affiliations, emphasizing the common bond of Islam.\textsuperscript{128}

Traditional customary law – urf – still continues to play an important role in conflict resolution. Tribes and neighborhoods have become central to both perpetrating and reducing revenge violence, and instructing and controlling militias. Small-scale incidents can easily escalate to major inter-neighborhood and intertribal violence as each group weighs in to protect its own.\textsuperscript{129}

However, with the judicial system stalled, tribal influences have gained access into the criminal justice processes. Tribes and militias have exploited the deterioration of the judicial system and lack of accountability by evading the law, protecting their own from arrest when implicated in crimes, or by taking the law into their own hands.\textsuperscript{130} The population is aware of the roles that tribes and neighborhood protection structures can play. Even when issues are referred to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, tensions can be either calmed or fomented, depending on the nature of individual elders, history, and communities. However, elders do not always feel that they can truly resolve disputes, and that they instead are often resort to quelling violence without resolving the dispute at hand. That in turn leads to tensions reigniting over time. The informal dispute resolution system focuses on preventing retribution and revenge from escalating into large scale violence.\textsuperscript{131}

The tribal system in Libya is much credited for preserving Islam in Libya, and by doing so it has also contributed to affirming a traditional but moderate vision of Islam. However, the overthrow of Qadhafi’s regime has paved the way for an ever growing Islamist presence (see section 7). Former NTC President Mustafa Jalil’s declaration to adopt \textit{sharia} as the principle source of legislation for the coming constitution, may have been seen as serving political purposes, i.e. rewarding Islamist militias for their participation in the uprising. It also serves as an indication of shared political ambitions to build a new Libyan state on Islamic basis. This in turn further promotes Salafists and

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
other radical currents who are pushing for the adoption of sharia as the only law. Tribes are likely considered as the strongest counterweight to radicalism, tribal elders – wujaha – have attempted to tone down Islamist discourse by engaging in outreach to Salafists, by encouraging them into local councils and incorporating their militias into formal security sectors. Tribal leaders have also prevented young people from joining Salafi groups and militias.

The confrontation between radical militias and tribes on the more legitimate law (urf vs. sharia) is becoming more evident. Radical powers are trying to erode the traditional role of the tribes. Radical Islamists warn against nepotism and favoritism as anti-Islamic products of tribalism.

7. ISLAMISTS

7.1 Background

Islamists per definition are adherents of an ideological movement that wants Islam to govern all aspects of society; from economy, politics and culture, to communal relations and family, whereby society is regulated through sharia. Islamism seeks to reconcile Islam with modernization of society and technological innovation, while resisting the Western cultural and political influence. Islamists aim to establish an Islamic state whose legislation is based on religious law. However, there is no single codification of sharia law, and the actual interpretation of Islamic doctrine varies widely between different Muslim clerics.

Islam became central in modern Libyan political life more than a century ago. It was introduced by the Sanussi order, founded in Mecca in 1837 by the Algerian born cleric, Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanussi, who sought to regenerate Muslim identity and spirituality. He created the al-Sanussi order, a revivalist movement that brought together Sufi Islamic tradition and religious reform based on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, which also is the basis of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism. Al-Sanussi moved to Libya in the mid nineteenth century.

The Sanussi order rose to prominence during the colonial time when it proclaimed its anti-colonial campaign under the leadership of Umar al-Mukhtar, a religious leader educated in the Sanussi order. Following the country's independence in 1951, al-Sanussi's grandson Muhammad Idris was crowned king of Libya. The Sanussi order thrived in eastern Cyrenaica where the movement had its roots and stronghold. King Idris offered refuge to fleeing members of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood under the Nasser regime. Many of the Egyptians offered political asylum in Libya taught at the

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133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Primoz, M., Who are the Islamists?, About.com, no date.
136 Ibid.
137 Omar, M., The Islamists are Coming, Chapter 6; Libya Rebuilding from Scratch, USIP, March 2012.
Libyan Universities, where they contributed to building a student branch of the Brotherhood. Qadhafi viewed the order as a threat and sought therefore to marginalize Sanussi influences in the eastern province. Qadhafi had the grave of al-Mukhtar moved from Benghazi to a remote area beyond Tubruq.

Nevertheless, Qadhafi, like many authoritarian leaders, used religion to legitimize and consolidate power. He called for the implementation of sharia and banned alcohol, nightclubs and prostitution in an effort to eliminate potential opposition. Qadhafi disbanded the Muslim Brotherhood when he came to power in 1969. By the 1970s most of the Brotherhood lived in exile. Those that remained operated underground, but were able to sustain a council (shura) inside the country. Many clandestine Brotherhood members took advantage of Qadhafi’s policy of sending students abroad to reconnect with the organization in exile.

The first radical jihadi cells were created in 1970s. In the 1980s young men mobilized around the call for Jihad in Afghanistan against the forces of the Soviet Union. Upon return jihadi fighters started to focus on the injustices of the Qadhafi regime. This led to a massive crackdown from the part of regime in the 1990s. Hundreds of cell members were arrested and imprisoned in Abu Salim. In the late 1990s the government started to negotiate with the Islamists in exchange for reconciliation with the government and denouncement of violence. As a result more than one hundred members of the Muslim Brotherhood were released in 2006. This followed with the release of hundreds of LIFG members in 2008. Amongst the key authors of the reconciliation agreement was Abdalhakim Bilhajj.

7.2 Islamists influences in Post-Qadhafi Libya

Islamists may not have been the forerunners of the uprising, they did however, play a critical role in the conflict. Most of the militias that fought against Qadhafi had an Islamist, and sometimes a jihadi, background. In the east, Isma’il al-Sallabi, an Islamist commander close to the Muslim Brotherhood, headed the February 17th Brigade based in Benghazi. In the west, Abdalhakim Bilhajj, who later commanded the TMC, spearheaded the attacks on Tripoli.

Unlike the Brotherhood movements in Egypt and Tunisia, the Libyan Brotherhood was not able to build institutional support in universities, syndicates, unions and neighborhoods. Subsequently, the Brotherhood, the LIFG, and others did not connect with the masses in the same way, nor did they manage to build effective organizational structures or institutions within Libya. Despite that, these groups managed to prosper in Libya’s nascent political scene. To begin with the political Islamic forces, despite their limited political experience, are the only political force with a national

138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
141 Omar, M., *The Islamists are Coming, Chapter 6; Libya Rebuilding from Scratch*, USIP, March 2012.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
agenda and reach, in contrast with the rest of the loose alliances of local actors dominating the political landscape. In addition, and in reference to what has been mentioned in previous sections, Islamists attain strong influences through local and political networks and religious institutions, and most importantly the security sector. Another contributing element is the Islamist relentless commitment to eliminate remnants of the former regime. The recent months of inter-militia fighting also bears witness to that struggle. Islamist forces have proven that they still retain the ability to deploy religious symbolism and rhetoric in a conservative society, and that their strong revolutionary credentials have provided them with an edge over other political forces, an edge that could also contribute to protracting the ongoing conflict over time.


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